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INTERPRETATION OF THE THREE DAY NOTICE
REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE 26(2) OF THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
Article 261 of the Warsaw Convention,' and specifically the
three day notice requirement of section 2, was recently the subject
of litigation for the first time in a United States court.! Article
26(2) provides in part that: "In case of damage [to baggage], the
person entitled to the delivery must complain to the carrier forth-
with after the discovery of the damage, and at the latest, within 3
days from the date of receipt in the case of baggage ... . In
149 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876 (1934) provides:
(1) Receipt by the person entitled to the delivery of baggage or
goods without complaint shall be prima facie evidence that the
same have been delivered in good condition and in accordance
with the document of transportation.
(2) In case of damage, the person entitled to delivery must com-
plain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery of the dam-
age, and, at the latest, within 3 days from the date of receipt
in the case of baggage and 7 days from the date of receipt in
the case of goods. In the case of delay the complaint must be
made at the latest within 14 days from the date on which the
baggage or goods have been placed at his disposal.
(3) Every complaint must be made in writing upon the document
of transportation or by separate notice in writing dispatched
within the times aforesaid.
(4) Failing complaint within the times aforesaid, no action shall
lie against the carrier, save in the case of fraud on his part.
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000 et seq., T.S. No. 876 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as Warsaw Convention or Convention]; see D. GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AIR-
LEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION (1937), for a critical analysis of
the Convention.
3 Sofranski v. KLM Royal Rutch Airlines, 68 Misc.2d 402, 326 N.Y.S.2d
870 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
4 49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876 (1934). The Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Con-
vention, signed on September 28, 1955, altered article 26(2) by changing three,
seven and fourteen days mentioned therein to seven, fourteen and twenty-one
days respectively. These modifications were never accepted by the United States.
Therefore, the limits remained unaltered whenever a case was brought in the Unit-
ed States. The Montreal Agreement that was adopted by the United States did not
change the limits of article 26(2). Article 26(2) is not changed in the proposed
Guatemala Protocol. ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971). See also Mankiewicz, The
1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to Further Amend the 1929 Warsaw Conven-
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Sofranski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,' plaintiff brought an action
under the Warsaw Convention alleging that her baggage suffered
water damage during an international flight. The carrier moved to
dismiss because plaintiff failed to notify the carrier by a written
complaint within three days of the receipt of the allegedly damaged
baggage as required by article 26(2). The New York City Civil
Court determined that plaintiff had not received adequate notice of
the three day limitation as required by articles 3 and 4 of the
Convention; therefore, the court held that plaintiff could not have
been expected to have been aware of the short period of limitation
within which a claim for alleged damage to baggage must be filed.!
Sofranski is an example of United States courts" continuing struggle
to interpret and apply the Warsaw Convention." Although the
court in Sofranski held the three day notice limitation inapplicable
to the facts of the case, it did not exhaust alternative lines of
reasoning that lead to similar or even opposite conclusions. A court
faced with a question of first impression concerning the proper
interpretation and application of article 26(2) can resort to: (i)
analogies between similar articles of the Convention that have
previously been interpreted by other courts and/or (ii) common
law contract analyses.
I. HISTORICAL BASIS
The Warsaw Convention of 1929 was signed when the aviation
tion, 38 J. AnT L. & COM. 519 (1972); Mankiewicz, Warsaw Convention: The
1971 Protocol of Guatemala City, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 336 (1972). For
another interpretation of the Guatemala Protocol, see 5 N.Y.U. J. INT. L. &
POLITICS 313 (1972).
68 Misc.2d 402, 326 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
"Id. at 872.
7 The courts of the State of New York have decided the majority of the War-
saw Convention cases brought in the United States. The inherent problems of
interpreting the Warsaw Convention, however, are common to all circuits.
'See, e.g., Molitch v. Irish Int. Airlines, 436 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1970) (inter-
preting article 29); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aerre Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aft'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aft'd per curiam, 390
U.S. 455 (1968), rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968) (interpreting articles
3 and 4); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965) (interpreting article 3); Parker v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (interpreting articles
3 and 4); Parke, Davis and Co. v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 11 Misc.2d
811, 170 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958) (interpreting article 26).
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industry was in its infancy.9 The objectives of the agreement were:
(i) to establish a uniform system of legal procedures and remedies
in the expanding area of international air transportation and (ii) to
provide the industry with protection against unlimited tort liability
by setting limits on the air carriers' liability for passengers and
baggage.1" As the aviation industry expanded, serious objections
arose, particularly from the United States, concerning the low
limits on liability contained in the Convention.' This led to a num-
ber of conflicting interpretations of the treaty by both state and
federal courts." Their decisions focus on the basic problem of
balancing the realities of present day air travel against the under-
lying objectives and purposes of the treaty.
A. Public Policy Considerations
Americans have been dissatisfied with the monetary limitations
of the Warsaw Convention as evidenced by various United States
courts' disregarding the procedural and monetary limitations of the
Convention in order to protect the American citizen from an ex-
cessively low limitation on recovery for death of passengers or
damage to baggage."8 This is evident when death or grievious in-
'The Warsaw Convention was opened for signature on October 12, 1929 and
entered into force as a treaty on February 13, 1933. The Convention was ratified
by the United States on October 29, 1934. For a list of the countries that are
parties to the Warsaw Convention, see 3 CCH Av. L. REP. 5 27,054 (1970).
"The liability of the carrier to each passenger is approximately $8,300; lia-
bility for damage or loss to baggage is approximately $331 as provided by article
22 of the Convention. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967). For a more com-
plete description of the history of the Warsaw Convention and subsequent related
agreements, see D. BILLYOU, AIR LAW (2d ed. 1964); C. SRnWCROSS AND K.
BEAUMONT, Am LAw (3d ed. 1969); Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L.
R V. 423 (1945).
11 See Beaumont, Liability of International Air Carriers, 97 L.J. 643 (1947);
Rhyne, International Law and Air Transportation, 47 MICH. L. REV. 41, 54-61
(1948).
"Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aerre Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), a0'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 455 (1968),
rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968); Egan v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 21 N.Y.2d
160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039
(1968). Compare Parker v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 447 S.W.2d
731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
" United States dissatisfaction has been considerable as noted by the United
States' denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, see Dep't of State Press Release
No. 268 (15 Nov. 1965); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aerre Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d
508, 513 (2d Cir. 1966); Egan v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234
N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968); So-
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juries have been sustained; to confine recovery to the limitations of
article 22 in these instances imposes a great burden on the in-
jured party. " While courts avoid direct mention of public policy
considerations, they are present in every decision involving the
recovery limitations prescribed by the Convention. For example,
in Sofranski, the three day time limitation of article 26(2) was
found to be "far too short a period to expect anyone to learn about
the contents of the Warsaw Convention,"'" and thus, plaintiff's
cause of action was not defeated by a literal reading and application
of the article. If American public policy considerations are followed
when interpreting articles of the Convention, however, it minimizes
franski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 68 Misc.2d 402, 326 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1971).
1
4 See note 10 supra. 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876 (1934) provides:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier
for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000
francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which
the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of
periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said
payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by
special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a
higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the
liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs
per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when
the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declara-
tion of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum
if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to
pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves
that that sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor
at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself
the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs per
passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the
French franc consisting of 651 milligrams of gold at the stand-
ard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may
be converted into any national currency in round figures.
"°See, e.g., Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1964). In this case the court held the pas-
senger had adequate notice of the limitations on liability as contained in his
ticket and liability for baggage loss was limited to $331 even though plaintiff
claimed a $10,000 loss. Ross v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 77 N.Y.S.2d
257 (Sup. Ct. 1948), af'd, 80 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1st Dept. 1948), 85 N.E.2d 880
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1955). In this case the court held that the passenger should have
known of the limitations on liability even if she had not seen the ticket before
boarding the plane. Thus, the liability of the carrier was limited to a maximum
of $8,300 although plaintiff's medical expenses were much more than the $8,300
limit.
1668 Misc.2d 402, 326 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
the status of the treaty as a true international agreement." There-
fore, if the courts in the United States allow recovery in excess of
the Convention's limits, the treaty becomes Americanized and
tailored to fit the American notion of what is just compensation in
a Warsaw situation." To undermine the Convention by public
,policy considerations of one signatory country, would lead to the
weakening and eventual demise of the treaty as an effective means
of regulating air carrier liability in international air transportation.
B. Treaty Interpretation Considerations
The status of the Warsaw Convention as a treaty19 can determine
how a court approaches and subsequently interprets an article of
the Convention. In general, the concept of treaty interpretation as
expounded by the United States Supreme Court is based on the
proposition that treaties are to receive a fair and liberal interpreta-
tion according to the intention of the contracting parties."0 The
majority of courts in the United States have given the Convention
a liberal interpretation.' The question arises, however, whether the
underlying principles of the Convention have been subordinated by
these liberal interpretations of the treaty. Although United States
courts have consistently interpreted the Convention liberally, they
must also look beyond the form of the treaty to its history, back-
ground and any other pertinent information that might indicate the
drafters' intentions in adopting a specific article.' Also, the courts
cannot add to or detract from the provisions' of a treaty regardless
"An English judge exclaimed in the case of Samuel Montagu and Co. v.
Swiss Air Transport Co., [19661 2 Q.B. 306, 1 AU E.R. 814 (C.A.), that "it
would be fantastic if the success of an action on a contract of carriage depended
on whether it was brought in the courts of the United States or the courts of this
country." See generally 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 698 (1967).
18 Id.
19 A treaty is the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. art. IV.
201 KENT'S COMMENTARIES (14th ed. 1896) 208; 5 MOORE, DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (1906) 252, 253; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
21 Boryk v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 332 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Egan
v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968); Stolk v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 58 Misc.2d 1008, 299 N.Y.S.2d 58, afl'd, 64 Misc.2d 859, 316 N.Y.S.2d
455 (1970); Sofranski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 68 Misc.2d 402, 326
N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
'Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1950); Valentine v. United
States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Santovicenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931); United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
13 Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
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of the resultant inconvenience to the parties." When these guide-
lines for treaty interpretation are combined with American public
policy considerations, they provide an adequate basis for a detailed
inquiry into the proper interpretation and application of the three
day notice requirement of article 26 (2) of the Warsaw Convention.
HI. FIRST IMPRESSION ALTERNATIVES
A. Analogies with Similar Articles of the Warsaw Convention
1. Articles 3 and 4
In early cases, courts adhered literally to the terms of the Con-
vetion; thus, plaintiffs were unable to avoid the low liability limits
imposed by the Convention.' Later, as a result of public criticism
of the Convention's unrealistically low recovery limits," American
courts began undermining the Convention by resorting to a broad
interpretation of the "notice" requirements of articles 3" and 4.28
4 1n re Zalewski's Estate, 177 Misc. 384, 30 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
'* See cases cited note 15 supra.
" For a statistical chart comparing passenger awards in Warsaw and non-
Warsaw suits, see Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 554 (1967).
2749 Stat. 3015, T.S. No. 876 (1934) provides:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a
passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of neces-
sity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not
have the effect of depriving the transportation of its internation-
al character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of trans-
portation, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of
this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger
without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not
be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this conven-
tion which exclude or limit his liability.
2849 Stat. 3015-16, T.S. No. 876 (1934) provides:
(1) For the transportation of baggage, other than small personal
objects of which the passenger takes charge himself, the carrier
must deliver a baggage check.
(2) The baggage check shall be made out in duplicate, one part
for the passenger and the other part for the carrier.
(3) The baggage check shall contain the following particulars:
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This interpretation allowed the courts to circumvent the monetary
limits of article 22. In Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aerre Italiane, S.p.A. 0
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the notice provided
'in the carrier's ticket had to be carefully worded and printed in a
reasonably sized type to insure that passengers had adequate notice
of the Convention's application and effect." The court in Lisi con-
cluded that a carrier could not avail itself of the monetary limita-
tions contained in article 22 unless adequate notice was given."
This decision started the circumvention of the Convention's limita-
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(d) The number of the passenger ticket;
(e) A statement that delivery of the baggage will be made to
the bearer of the baggage check;
(f) The number and weight of the packages;
(g) The amount of the value declared in accordance with
article 22(2);
(h) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention.
(4) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the baggage check shall
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of trans-
portation which shall none the less be subject to the rules of
this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts baggage
without a baggage check having been delivered, or if the bag-
gage check does not contain the particulars set out at (d), (f),
and (h), above, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail him-
self of those provisions of the convention which exclude or
limit his liability.
29 See note 14 supra. The first case to reflect the courts' new approach to the
Convention was Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965). The court in Mertens held the delivery re-
quirement of article 3(2) to mean that the passenger should have a "reasonable
opportunity" prior to take off to protect himself above the limits of article 22.
This opportunity included notice of the limits by printing on the ticket that was
both noticeable and readable. Here, the printing on the ticket was held both un-
noticeable and unreadable especially when the passenger had been handed his
ticket after he had boarded a plane that was about to take off. Warren v. Flying
Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965) emphasized that the purpose of
the delivery of a ticket pursuant to article 3 was to warn the passenger of the
low limits on liability provided in the Convention and therefore provide him an
opportunity to purchase additional insurance covering the flight.
"p253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966),
aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 455 (1968), rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968).
For a discussion of this case, see 33 J. Air L. & Com. 698 (1967).
31 Id. at 514; see note 27 supra.
.3 See note 30 supra. The court termed the notice contained in the ticket and
baggage check as being in "Lilliputian print" and doubted that a person would
be able to understand the meaning of the language even if one could read it.
370 F.2d at 514 n.10.
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tions on recovery; now, each clause of the ticket or baggage check
is subjected to close scrutiny for clarity and readability." A majority
of the courts have followed this interpretation.' A few, however,
have refused to affirm the Lisi rationale and have continued to
strictly interpret and apply the Convention." Courts relying on the
Lisi decision have held that failure to comply with the notice rb-
quirements of articles 3 and 4 waives the liability limitations of the
Convention making the carrier subject to unlimited recovery."
By analogy, when the notice requirements of articles 3 and 4
are not complied with, not only are the limitations contained in
article 22 waived by the carrier but the three day notice require-
ment in article 26(2) is also waived. A plaintiff whose baggage is
injured can allege that the ticket or baggage claim was not delivered
or printed in the proper manner, therefore, the delivery and notice
requirements of articles 3 and 4 could not have been fulfilled. If a
passenger does not have adequate notice of the three day time
limitation, the carrier cannot limit the time period in which the
passenger must file a complaint for damaged baggage.
This type of analysis, however, defeats one of the main goals of
the Convention: uniform interpretation of the articles among sig-
natory countries. 7 Were the goal of uniform interpretation of the
Convention rejected, the Convention would cease to be a viable
international agreement; instead, it would become a plethora of
unilateral statements from each signatory country. This would lead
"Accord, Egan v. KolIsman Instr. Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199,
287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968). In Egan, the court
found that the ticket had failed to comply with article 3 since it could not be
reasonably deciphered. Therefore, the carrier could not avail itself to the mone-
tary limitations contained in article 22.
'Boryk v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 332 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (size
of type and form of notice in ticket not adequate); Egan v. Kollsman Instr. Corp.,
21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1039 (1968) (non compliance with article 3); Stolk v. Compagnie Nationale
Air France, 58 Misc.2d 1008, 299 N.Y.S.2d 58, aft'd, 64 Misc.2d 859, 316
N.Y.S.2d 455 (1970) (inadequate notice by articles 3 and 4); Bayless v. Varig
Airlines Inc., 10 Av. Cas. 17,881 (1968) (not adequate delivery by article 3).
"Parker v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969). The court held that even though the printing on the baggage check
and ticket was small there was adequate notice of the Convention's limitations;
see also Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 43 Misc.2d
856, 259 N.Y.S,2d 277 (App.Div. 1965) (citing Seth).
"8 See cases cited note 34 supra.
'
7 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 498-99 (1967).
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to the diversity of self-serving interpretations the Convention was
originally designed to prevent.8
2. Article 29
Another approach to the interpretation of aritcle 26(2) is to
analogize its three day limitation to the two year limitation con-
tained in article 298" of the Convention. The application of article
29 is uniformly held to be unaffected by proof of non-delivery of
a passenger ticket or delivery of a ticket that fails to contain proper
notice of the Convention's limitations on recovery."' In Bergman
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,"1 the New York appellate
division of the supreme court found the print on the carrier's ticket
to be too small to notify the passenger of the limitations of article
:29. The court held, however, the suit to be barred since the two
year limitation in which to bring the action had elapsed.' The
"I Even after the Lisi decision that broadened the notice and delivery require-
ments of article 3, the United Kingdom continued to cite as good law the de-
cision of Preston v. Hunting Air Transp. Ltd., [1956] 1 Q.B. 454. Preston was
based on a strict interpretation of article 3. See also Grey v. American Airlines
Inc., 95 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
8949 Stat. 3021, T.S. No. 876 (1934) provides:
(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not
brought within 2 years, reckoned from the date of arrival at
the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought
to have arrived, or from the date on which the transportation
stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be de-
termined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
40 In Molitch v. Irish Int. Airlines, 436 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1970), defendant
airline appealed from a ruling that the limitations in article 29(1) of the Con-
vention "excluded or limited" the carrier's liability within the meaning of article
3(2); therefore, it could not be invoked to bar the action if the carrier failed
to provide adequate notice of the limitations in the passenger ticket. The ap-
pellate court distinguished Lisi on the ground that it would be both meaningless
and unjustified to extend and interpret article 29 as being analogous to article 22.
Even if the passenger had known about the statute of limitations before the flight,
he could not have protected himself against the statute with additional insurance.
Bapes v. Trans World Airlines, 209 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ill. 1962); Jaffe v. British
Overseas Airways Corp., 34 A.D.2d 527, 309 N.Y.2d 58, lv. to app. den. 27
N.Y.2d 796, 315 N.Y.S.2d 856, 264 N.E.2d 349 (1970); Bergman v. Pan Amer-
ican World Airways, Inc., 32 A.D.2d 95, 299 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1969); Sackos v.
Compagnie Air France, 9 Av. Cas. 17,673 (1965); S. D. Tehrani and Co. v.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 9 Av. Cas. 17,344 (1964).
41 32 A.D.2d 95, 299 N.Y.S.2d 982 (App.Div. 1969).
41 Id. at 984. The court further reasoned that the statute of limitations never
limits liability nor does it exclude it, however, it renders existing liability unen-
forceable. The court distinguished article 22 from article 29 and concluded that
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majority of courts follow the Bergman conclusion and interpret
article 29 to be an absolute bar to initiating a suit for damages
against a carrier once the two year statute has expired.4'
By drawing an analogy between the two year limitation con-
tained in article 29 and the three day notice limitation of article
26(2), a carrier-oriented argument can be proposed. First, it can
be argued that article 26(2) is similar to article 29 since both
articles do not exclude or limit liability but render existing liability
unenforceable if a suit is not filed within the limitation periods as
contained in each respective article. Secondly, there is no provision
in the Convention forbidding or excusing the application of the
time limitations contained in article 26(2) or article 29. Thirdly,
even if the passenger did not have proper notice of the three day
limitation before the flight, he could not have protected himself
against this limitation prior to the damage to his baggage. Finally,
the passenger has sufficient time to learn about the three day limita-
tion and comply with the notice requirements after the damage
occurs.
These lines of reasoning are logical but are subject to an equally
logical rebuttal. For example, a court may reason that article 26 (2)
does exclude or limit liability" of the carrier and, therefore, is more
closely aligned with article 22 that requires adequate notice to be
binding on the passenger rather than the arbitrary two year statute
of limitation contained in article 29. If this reasoning is accepted,
it would not be difficult for a court to apply the Lisi rationale and
conclude that the failure of a carrier to provide adequate notice of
the Convention to the passenger would result in the airline waiving
the article 26(2) notice of complaint requirement. This argument
is further buttressed by the intent of the original framers of the
Convention that the period of two years for taking action under
article 29 was independent of the article 26(2) requirements. '
Therefore, to analogize article 26(2) to article 29 would expand
article 29 did not limit liability as did article 22. Also, the court could find no
provision in the Convention that forbade or excused the application of the limi-
tations contained in article 29. Therefore, the two year limitation was applied
and the action was dismissed. Id. at 984-85.
"See cases cited note 40 supra.
44 Sofranski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 68 Misc.2d 402, 326 N.Y.S.2d
870 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
5 Beaumont, Need for Revisions and Amplification of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 16 J. Ant L. & CoM. 395, 409 (1949).
the meaning and application of article 26(2) beyond the original
scope intended by the drafters of the Convention."6
3. Article 26
Although the three day notice limitation of article 26(2) had
not been a subject of litigation until the Sofranski case, the seven
day limitation applicable to damaged goods contained in article
26(2) had been litigated." Parke, Davis and Co. v. British Over-
seas Airways Corp." involved an action for the loss of a shipment
of goods. The New York City court held that the failure of the
plaintiff to complain to the carrier within the seven day time limit
as required by article 26 (2) barred the action. ' The court reviewed
briefly the short notice requirements of article 26(2) and con-
cluded that the article was binding on the parties even though the
time limits specified were much shorter than those normally al-
lowed by the carriers who are members of the International Air
Transport Association." The New York City court held the seven
day provision of article 26 (2) to be applicable in this fact situation;
the plaintiff's failure to give notice within the prescribed time limit
was not excused. Although Parke provides the closest possible
analogy to the interpretation of the three day time limitation, its
decision was not mentioned by the court in Sofranski. With the
scarcity of cases interpreting article 26(2), resort to analyzing and
applying the article through the use of common law contract
theories as applied by United States courts is helpful.
B. Common Law Contract Analyses
In American common law contract cases, a contract in whole or
in part is declared invalid if it is "unconscionable" or if the contract
contains terms that are hidden or unclear." This type of analysis
46 See cases cited note 34 supra. In these cases, the courts have expanded the
meaning and application of articles 3 and 4 despite the fact that this interpreta-
tion is seemingly contrary to the original drafters' intentions.
4 Parke, Davis and Co. v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 11 Misc.2d 811,
170 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958). For other cases interpreting the Con-
vention in relation to air freight, see Orlove v. Philippine Air Lines Inc., 257 F.2d
384 (2d Cir. 1958); L. and C. Mayers Co. v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij
N.V., 108 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
48 11 Misc.2d 811, 170 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958).
4 91 d. at 388.
501d. at 387-88; see note 45 supra.
5'J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONRACTS § 56 (1970) [herein-
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was applied in the Sofranski case"5 when the court relied on Jessel
v. Lockwood Textile Corp." to support its position that the three
day limitation of article 26(2) was too short to be applied in that
particular situation. The court in Jessel indicated that although
parties were able to set a debarment deadline on claims by the
terms of their contract, the effectiveness of this limitation must be
determined by a reasonable interpretation and application of the
contract." This rationale is analogous to the reasoning found in
common law contract cases involving standardized contracts made
between parties of unequal bargaining strength." Thus, courts have
utilized a standard of reasonableness when confronted with limi-
tation clauses that are hidden, unclear or unexpected." A further
analysis of contract law reveals several instances when passengers
on international flights can claim there is no valid contract of car-
riage and therefore, they are not bound by the various articles of
the Convention contained therein.
It is a generally accepted proposition of contract law that no
contract can be formed unless the offeree knows of the offer at the
time of his alleged acceptance."' Therefore, if a passenger accepts
a ticket that clearly states the rights of the parties, the passenger is
after cited as CALAMARI & PERILLO]. See also Smith v. Kennedy, 43 Ala. App.
554, 195 So.2d 820 (1966), cert. denied, 280 Ala. 718, 195 So.2d 289 (1966)
(contractual exemption from tort liability); Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co.,
48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966) (rejecting fine print); Steven v. Fidelity and
Casualty Co. of N.Y., 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284 (1962) (clauses of a con-
tract which limit liability between parties of unequal bargaining strength are void
if clauses are unclear, unexpected or inconspicuous); Joseph v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 224 S.C. 105, 77 S.E.2d 583, 40 A.L.R.2d 742 (1953) (no mutual assent).
1268 Misc.2d 402, 326 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
r3 276 A.D. 378, 95 N.Y.S.2d 77 (App.Div. 1950).
54 Id. at 78.
5' CALAMARI & PERILLO § 25; For public policy considerations concerning the
contract of carriage see Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aerre Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp.
237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aft'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), af/'d per curiam, 390
U.S. 455 (1968), rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968); see generally cases cited
note 51 supra.
56 Sofranski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 68 Misc.2d 402, 326 N.Y.S.2d 870
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971); accord, Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aerre Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F.
Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), a/i'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), a/f'd per curiam,
390 U.S. 455 (1968), rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968); Egan v. Kollsman
Instr. Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968).
" 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 59 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS § 33 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
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bound by his acceptance of the contract." The terms of the "con-
tract", however, must be expressly called to the passenger's attention
if they are not reasonably expected to be contained in the ticket or
if the terms of the "contract" are not readable because of fine
print." The question therefore revolves around whether the person
receiving the ticket can be expected, as a reasonable man, to have
read the terms of the proposed agreement."0 The precise facts of
each case become paramount in determining whether the print on
the ticket is sufficient notice to bind the passenger to its terms.
There are other policy decisions that have been made to protect
a party against his failure to read a ticket containing provisions that
are deemed to be unfair under the circumstances.' This is particu-
larly true of a contract of adhesion." In the landmark case of
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,' an exculpatory provision
of an express warranty in a contract of sale that excluded claims
against a dealer or manufacturer for personal injuries resulting
from a defective car was held void as against public policy. The
New Jersey Supreme court stated that "the task of the judiciary is
to administer the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Part of this
burden is to protect the ordinary man against the loss of important
rights through what, in effect, is the unilateral act of the manu-
facturer."' Thus, the purchaser of the car in Henningsen can be
analogized to the purchaser of an airline ticket; neither purchaser
can participate in arms length bargaining concerning the terms in
his contract. The purchaser must accept the contract as it is written
I' 1 WILLISTON § 90A-B; Restatement of Contracts § 70 (1932).
1 WILLISTON 5 90C.
1 WILLISTON 5 90D; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 70 (1932); Poel v.
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
61 CALAMARI & PERILLO § 25 n.30.
62 This term refers to a standardized contract prepared entirely by one party
to the transaction for the acceptance of the other. This type of contract, because
of a disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and the second party,
must be accepted or rejected by the second party on a "take it or leave it" basis
without opportunity for bargaining and under conditions that the "adherer" can-
not obtain the desired product or service save by acquiescing in the form agree-
ment. Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y., 377 P.2d 284, 297 (1962);
see Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1075 & n.17 (1953).
6332 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960).
"161 A.2d at 94.
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and therefore, unknowingly consent to the unrealistic limitations
on liability of the seller or carrier contained therein.'5
Application of the Henningsen rationale to an article 26(2)
situation results in the three day notice limitation not being enforced
in the absence of a plain and clear notification of the limitation to
the passenger. The adequacy of notification is a question of fact
based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the forma-
tion of the contract. A rigid application of the contract in border-
line cases casts an unexpected burden upon the traveling public
and shows judicial preference for the explicit terms of the contract
without consideration of the particular facts of the transaction."
Failure to comply with the short three day limitation of article
26(2) can also be excused in light of the lack of willfulness of the
breach by the passenger and the harsh forfeiture that results. This
rationale enables the court, when the circumstances warrant it, to
refuse to enforce the limitation when there is an unconscionable
inadequacy of consideration."' Unfair surprise coupled with unequal
bargaining power are essential criteria in determining whether a
contract is unconscionable."8 Thus, article 26 (2) of the Convention
can be challenged as unconscionable by parties of unequal bargain-
ing power when the passenger has inadequate notice of the article."'
In this situation, the airline can be denied the protection of the
article 26(2) three day limitation. If a court, however, denies the
application of the three day time limitation on the basis of uncon-
scionability, the Warsaw Convention would be unilaterally modified
without either the use of the amending process, as provided in the
"'The Henningsen court's interpretation of "consent" required an understand-
ing consent by the consumer to any limitation on the seller's liability that was
contained in the contract. Id. at 92.
66 Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y., 377 P.2d 284, 298 (1962).
6
7 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1932); See also, CALAMARI & PERILLO
31; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72, comment at 291 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1964); Albrecht Chemical Co. v. Anderson Trading Corp., 298 N.Y. 437,
84 N.E.2d 625 (1949).
6" CALAMARI & PERILLO § 56.
69 This is contrary to a well established rule in the United States that the con-
ditions set forth in properly filed tariffs are applicable to passengers even though
unknown to them. See Robert v. Pan American World Airways, 12 Av. Cas.
17,734 (1972); Martin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 11 Av. L. Rep. 18,231 (Pa.
Super. June 22, 1971); Mao v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
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Convention,"0 or the concurrance of the other parties to the inter-
national treaty.
III. CONCLUSION
When dealing with a question of first impression concerning the
three day notice limitation of article 26 (2), the courts should follow
a strict interpretation of the Convention as exemplified in Parke.'
A strict interpretation of each article has a valid basis in the Con-
vention itself" and would prevent courts from indulging in judicial
treaty-making when the language of the article is clear and concise
on its face."8 The wholesale adoption by the courts of the United
States of a strict and literal interpretation of article 26 (2) will lend
uniformity and certainty to the article. Uniformity in interpretation
and application will, in reality, provide the needed impetus to effect
changes in the Convention. If article 26(2), when strictly and
literally applied, proves to be unreasonable, inadequate or other-
wise undesirable, it can be changed through the Convention's
amending process." For example, through the amending procedure
the limits of recovery contained in article 22 of the Convention
have been changed and increased whenever a majority of the sig-
natory countries felt there was a legitimate need for this action.7"
7
1See D. BILLYOU, AIR LAW, at 580-84 (2d ed. 1964) and articles 39, 40,
and 41 of the Convention. Article 41 provides:
Any High Contracting Party shall be entitled not earlier than two
years after the coming into force of this convention to call for the
assembling of a new international conference in order to consider
any improvements which may be made in this convention. To this
end it will communicate with the Government of the French Re-
public which will take necessary measures to make preparations for
such conference.
71 11 Misc.2d 811, 170 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958).
"See note 10 supra.
"' See note 4 supra; see also Lisi, 370 F.2d at 515 (dissenting opinion).
74 See note 70 supra.
'The liability of the carrier to each passenger was changed from $8,300 to
$16,600 by the Hague Protocol of 1955. After the United States' denunciation of
the Hague Protocol and threatened withdrawal from the Warsaw Convention,
an interim arrangement between the United States and foreign carriers for a vol-
untary waiver of liability up to $75,000 was concluded at Montreal in 1966. Re-
cently, the 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to amend the Warsaw Convention
established a $100,000 limit of liability of carriers for death or personal injury
to a passenger. See Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to Further
Amend the 1929 Warsaw Convention, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 519 (1972); Lowen-
feld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 497 (1967).
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By extending the amendment process to other articles, such as
article 26(2), amendments can be enacted that will be universally
accepted and uniformly applied. The constant amending and up-
dating of the article by using the revision process provided by the
Convention will realistically meet the ever changing needs of the
present day international air traveler. Moreover, this procedure
will allow the courts of the United States to apply the three day
limitation of article 26 (2) as it was written, and thus, eliminate the
judiciary's struggle to balance the realities of air travel with the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
Edward 0. Coultas
